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Abstract
In this paper, we study the problem of how to defend classi-
fiers against adversarial attacks that fool the classifiers using
subtly modified input data. In contrast to previous works, here
we focus on the white-box adversarial defense where the at-
tackers are granted full access to not only the classifiers but
also defenders to produce as strong attacks as possible. In such
a context we propose viewing a defender as a functional, a
higher-order function that takes functions as its argument to
represent a function space, rather than fixed functions conven-
tionally. From this perspective, a defender should be realized
and optimized individually for each adversarial input. To this
end, we propose RIDE, an efficient and provably convergent
self-supervised learning algorithm for individual data estima-
tion to protect the predictions from adversarial attacks. We
demonstrate the significant improvement of adversarial de-
fense performance on image recognition, e.g. , 98%, 76%, 43%
test accuracy on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet datasets
respectively under the state-of-the-art BPDA attacker.
Introduction
Recent studies have demonstrated that as classifiers, deep
neural networks (e.g. , CNNs) are quite vulnerable to adver-
sarial attacks that only add quasi-imperceptible perturbations
to the input data but completely change the predictions of the
classifiers (e.g. , [Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow, Shlens,
and Szegedy, 2014; Madry et al., 2017; Carlini and Wagner,
2017; Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner, 2018]).
In general adversarial attackers can be categorized into two
groups based on the accessibility to the classifiers. White-box
attackers (e.g. , [Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow, Shlens,
and Szegedy, 2014; Carlini and Wagner, 2017]) have full
knowledge of the classifiers such as network architectures as
well as the trained weights. In this case, those attackers can
directly calculate the perturbations that change the prediction
using gradient ascent. Black-box attackers (e.g. , [Ilyas et al.,
2018; Su, Vargas, and Sakurai, 2019]) have no right to access
the classifiers, but they can observe the classification pre-
dictions given different inputs to estimate the perturbations.
Black-box attackers are easier to apply on a classifier under
privacy constraints but generally lead to lower success rate.
∗Work was done during an internship at MERL.
†Corresponding author.
Adversarial training (e.g. , [Goodfellow, Shlens, and
Szegedy, 2014; Madry et al., 2017]) was introduced to de-
fend against such attacks by augmenting the training data
with adversarial samples. However, defense using adversarial
training is resource-intensive since it requires large labeled
datasets and retraining of the classifier.
To counter such attacks without changing existing classi-
fiers, in this paper, we focus on adversarial defenders, which
work as pre-processing modules to estimate the unattacked
clean data to recover the prediction. The defenders can be
categorized into either gray-box (or oblivious [Carlini and
Wagner, 2017]) defenders, where only the classifier but not
the defender is accessible by the attackers, or white-box de-
fenders, where the defender is also exposed to the attackers.
State-of-the-art gray-box defenders use transformation mod-
els trained with labeled adversarial-clean image pairs (e.g.
,[Liao et al., 2018; Akhtar, Liu, and Mian, 2018]) to remove
the perturbations. However, since such modules are differen-
tiable, the attackers can directly regard the defender as part of
the classifier and conduct gradient ascent under the white-box
setting. Therefore previous attempts on white-box defend-
ers mainly focus on the using of functions with obfuscated
gradients, where either the functions are non-differentiable
[Guo et al., 2018], or the gradients are hard to compute due
to very deep computation [Samangouei, Kabkab, and Chel-
lappa, 2018]. However, those defenders that claim white-box
robustness are recently broken by the Backward Pass Differ-
entiable Approximation (BPDA) technique [Athalye, Carlini,
and Wagner, 2018], which approximates the derivatives by
running the defender at the classifier forward pass and back-
propagate the gradients using a differentiable approximation.
Since the invisibility assumption in gray-box defenders
significantly increases the failure risk in practice, we there-
fore mainly focus on the white-box setting. That is, even the
defender is exposed to the attackers, it can still prevent the
attacker from not only direct derivative calculation but also
gradient approximation. Besides, we hope such a defender
does not require training and directly work at inference time.
To this end, we propose viewing the defense from the per-
spective of a functional, a higher-order function that takes
an individual adversarial sample as input and returns a new
defender function exclusive for this sample (Fig.1). Such a
design makes the defender input-dependent, whose gradients
are hard to be estimated without knowing the data prior (e.g.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the proposed functional defender. (a) A con-
ventional defender usually performs the defense with a fixed func-
tion. (b) In a functional defender, every defensive function itself is a
function of the input. Such a design significantly increases the diffi-
culty of an adversarial attacker from gradient calculation/estimation.
, the prior distribution of natural images). Specifically, the
functional is implemented to yield a parameterized neural
network defender for each input, which is optimized by mini-
mizing a self-supervised reconstruction loss using deep image
prior [Ulyanov, Vedaldi, and Lempitsky, 2018] or denoising
autoencoder [Vincent et al., 2008]. To further improve the
robustness, we propose a novel Robust Iterative Data Estima-
tion (RIDE) algorithm that accelerates the convergence of the
network output to the underlying clean data, which shares
similar high-level concepts with momentum [Qian, 1999].
To summarize, our main contributions includes: (1) we are
the first, to the best of our knowledge, to propose viewing
a defender as a functional that returns an input-dependent
function for every adversarial observation; (2) we propose a
novel iterative self-supervised optimization algorithm, called
RIDE, as an effective realization of such a defender; (3) we
demonstrate the significantly increased robustness of RIDE
against state-of-the-art BPDA white-box attackers, which
achieves 98%, 76%, 43% Top-1 test accuracy on MNIST,
CIFAR-10, and ImageNet datasets respectively.
Related Work
Adversarial Attack. The vulnerability of deep learning mod-
els to small perturbations was first demonstrated by Szegedy
et al. [2013]. Later, Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy [2014]
proposed an attacker of Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
that utilizes the gradient sign to generate adversarial pertur-
bations with only one-step update on the original image to
fool classifiers. To improve this method, several iterative al-
gorithms such as Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [Kurakin,
Goodfellow, and Bengio, 2016] and the Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD) attacker [Madry et al., 2017] were proposed
as well. Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard [2016] pro-
posed DeepFool to find the minimal perturbation that changes
the prediction. Athalye et al. [2017] proposed Expectation
over Transformation (EOT) to attack against a random dis-
tribution of transformations. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [2017]
showed the existence of universal adversarial perturbations
that can fool a classifier with a single perturbation image.
Such works above follow white-box attack, in contrast to
black-box attackers (e.g. , [Ilyas et al., 2018; Su, Vargas, and
Sakurai, 2019]). We refer readers to a nice survey by Akhtar
and Mian [2018] for more details in this direction.
In particular, Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner [2018] pro-
posed Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA)
based on the fact that a defender g always tries to recover the
clean sample x from an adversarial sample x˜. Therefore, one
can approximate the gradient of a defender w.r.t. the input
using an approximation with an identity matrix.
Adversarial Defense. Besides adversarial training (e.g. ,
[Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy, 2014; Madry et al., 2017;
Kannan, Kurakin, and Goodfellow, 2018; Sinha et al., 2019]),
Xie et al. [2019] recently introduced non-local means into the
classifiers as feature denoising blocks. More evaluations of
the robustness of classifiers are conducted by Hendrycks and
Dietterich [2019]. For defenders that do not require changing
of the classifier, Guo et al. [2018] showed the defense using
input transformations such as bit-depth reduction, total vari-
ance minimization (TVM), and image quilting while Prakash
et al. [2018] introduced pixel deflection. CNN-based denois-
ers (e.g. , [Liao et al., 2018]) or rectifiers (e.g. , [Akhtar, Liu,
and Mian, 2018]) can be trained with clean-adversarial image
pairs to remove adversarial noise. Samangouei, Kabkab, and
Chellappa [2018] proposed Defense-GAN that uses a gener-
ator trained to model the distribution of clean images, and
projects the adversarial sample into the space of the generator
before classifying them. However, successful training of a
GAN on datasets like ImageNet is still extremely challenging.
Different from previous literature, we propose a functional-
based defender that returns an unique defender function for
every individual input sample, which is the key feature that
makes our method much more robust to white-box attacks.
Self-Supervised Learning. Self-supervised learning is a
form of unsupervised learning where the data itself pro-
vides the supervision [Zisserman, 2018]. Representative
works in this direction include numerous variants of autoen-
coders [Tschannen, Bachem, and Lucic, 2018]. Recently,
Ulyanov, Vedaldi, and Lempitsky [2018] proposed deep im-
age prior (DIP) demonstrating that a neural network can be
used as a handcrafted prior with excellent results in inverse
problems such as denoising, super-resolution, and inpainting.
Shocher, Cohen, and Irani [2018] proposed deep internal
learning (DIL) with similar observations. In this paper, we
explore the applicability of those self-supervision algorithms
as the implementation of the functional-based defenders.
Preliminaries
Generally adversarial attacks can be expressed as the follow-
ing optimization problem (e.g. ,[Simon-Gabriel et al., 2019]):
max
‖∆x‖≤
` (f(x+ ∆x), f(x)) , (1)
where ∆x denotes the perturbation for input x, f denotes
the classifier,  ≥ 0 denotes a predefined (small) constant,
` denotes a proper loss function, and ‖ · ‖ denotes a norm
operator. As we see, the attacker is essentially seeking for the
adversarial sample x+ ∆x that is locally around x but can
change the prediction of the classifier as much as possible.
As discussed before, white-box attackers have full knowl-
edge of the classifiers and can utilize the derivatives of the
classifiers w.r.t. the inputs, i.e., ∂f∂x in Eq. 1, to determine the
perturbation ∆x using back propagation. On the contrary,
learning a defender can be formulated as a minimization
Figure 2: Characteristics of the reconstructed image using DIP when minimizing the reconstruction loss to the adversarial image. From left
to right: (a) clean image, (b) adversarial image, (c) (rescaled) adversarial perturbations, (d) class confidence scores (before softmax) over
iterations, and (e) Manhattan distances of the reconstructed image to either clean (dist2gt) or adversarial image (dist2adv) over iterations. In
(d), the green and red curves are for ground-truth and adversarial class labels, respectively, and the light gray curves are for the other classes.
optimization problem as follows:
min
g∈G
` (f(g(x+ ∆x)), f(x)) , (2)
where g ∈ G denotes a defender function that tries to recover
the original sample to minimize the prediction loss. In the
literature such defenders are often assumed to be invisible
to the attackers, which leads to gray-box defenders. clearly,
if a fixed differentiable g was known, an attacker could take
f˜ = f ◦ g as a new classifier to generate adversarial samples
using ∂f˜∂x . For g with obfuscated gradients,
∂g
∂x ≈ I is shown
to be an effective approximation by the BPDA attacker.
Adversarial Defenders as Functionals. As we discussed
above, any fixed-function defender can hardly survive white-
box attacks. This motivates us to rethink the solution from the
perspective of funtional, a higher-order function that takes
functions as its argument to represent a function space (i.e.
, a space made of functions where each function can be
thought of as a point). Conceptually, a functional defender is
equivalent to an ensemble of different conventional function-
based defenders. Now consider a functional g(x;ω(x)) as
the defender, whose input ω : X → W is a (hidden) function
over the a single input x ∈ X . In order to attack defender g,
the derivative ∂g∂x can be written as follows:
∂g
∂x
= [I,∇ω(x)]∇g(x;ω(x)), (3)
where∇ denotes the gradient operator, [·, ·] denotes the ma-
trix concatenation operator, and I denotes the identity matrix.
With full access to f and g, one may obtain∇g. However, the
calculation of ∇ω for hidden function ω without any prior
knowledge at all will be challenging for the attack, in return
leading to a significant increase in the success rate of defense.
Self-Supervision. To realize the functional defenders, we re-
fer to recent works in self-supervised learning that works on
each individual sample without seeing external data. Specif-
ically, DIP manages to estimate the true image by fitting
a corrupted image x˜, using a convolutional neural network
(CNN) h, with randomly initialized weights w, and an input
consisting of random noise z. Mathematically DIP tries to
solve the following optimization problem:
min
w∈W
`h (x˜, h(z;w, θ)) , (4)
where `h denotes the loss function for optimizing the network,
and θ denotes the network hyper-parameters during learning.
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Figure 3: Hypothesis of learning trajectories (i.e. the arrow curves)
in the input space for (a) DIP and (b) our proposed RIDE algorithm.
Here the red dot denotes the unknown clean input, while the red
dotted circle denotes the region where all the samples share the
same prediction. RIDE iteratively changes the estimation by convex
interpolation to prevent overfitting and improve prediction recovery.
In the end, the functional h returns a defender parameterized
by w = ω(x˜), which becomes an input-dependent hidden
function. To the best of our knowledge, however, they have
never been explored for adversarial defense. To verify their
potential usage, given an adversarial image, we feed the in-
termediate reconstructed outputs from DIP into a pretrained
ResNet50 model [He et al., 2016] to see whether the pre-
diction can be correctly recovered (Fig. 2). As we see in
Fig. 2(d), the output indeed manages to recover the origi-
nal prediction of the classifier before starting to overfit the
adversarial image. Meanwhile, we observe in Fig. 2(e) that
when the prediction is recovered, the distances of the output
to the clean image (dist2gt) are consistently smaller than the
distances to the adversarial image (dist2adv). This indicates
that during optimization, the reconstructed image approaches
the original image first, and then gradually diverges towards
the adversarial image, as illustrated in Fig. 3(a). Therefore,
how to effectively avoid such an overfitting problem in self-
supervised learning becomes the key challenge of the defense.
Later on we show two regularization techniques that signifi-
cantly improve the performance of DIP as a defender.
White-Box Defense with Self-Supervision
Problem Setup. Let (x, y) ∈ X × Y be a clean data pair
with a label y, and x˜ = x+ ∆x ∈ X˜ be an adversarial input.
In the adversarial defense, we observe (x˜, y) only, but not x.
Now given a pretrained classifier f : X → Y and a proper
loss function ` : Y × Y → R, we aim to learn our defender
g : X˜ ×W → X by optimizing the following problem:
min
ω∈Ω
E(x˜,y)∈X˜×Y
[
` (f(g(x˜, ω(x˜))), y)
]
, (5)
where E denotes the expectation operator, and ω : X˜ → W
denotes another (hidden) function. As discussed before, two
fundamental differences between our method and the liter-
ature such as denoisers [Liao et al., 2018] are: (1) no clean
data is needed to learn our defender, and (2) our defender
adaptively changes given each adversarial input. Such dis-
crimination is derived from the nature of a functional.
Hyper-Parameter Learning as Realization. From our anal-
ysis for Eq. 3, in order to design an effective white-box de-
fender, function ω has to be a hidden function, namely, its
explicit formula is unknown (otherwise, in the white-box
defense the attacker can compute the gradient in Eq. 3 as
well). To this end, inspired by DIP we propose a novel self-
supervised data estimation algorithm to embed the realiza-
tion of ω and g into the optimization of a neural network
h (z;w, θ) by defining ω(x˜) = w that outputs different net-
work parameters for every individual data point.
With the help of h (z;w, θ) we can further rewrite Eq. 5
as a network hyper-parameter learning problem as follows:
min
θ∈Θ
E(x˜,y)∈X˜×Y
[
` (f(xest), y)
]
, (6)
s.t.u,w ∈ arg min
u′,w′
L(x˜,u′,w′, θ),xest = Ez∼Z [h(z;w, θ)],
where L denotes a reconstruction loss, Z denotes a data dis-
tribution, and u denotes an auxiliary variable that will be
discussed in RIDE. Here we consider the clean data estimator
xest as the mean of the network outputs over the entire distri-
bution given the learned parameters, and define the output of
our defender as g(x˜, ω(x˜)) ≡ xest.
Efficient Solver by Converting Learning to Tuning. Eq. 6
essentially defines a bilevel optimization problem [Colson,
Marcotte, and Savard, 2007], and how to solve it effectively
and efficiently, in general, is nontrivial. However, since the
network hyper-parameters θ (e.g. , number of iterations) often
do not require continuity, to minimize ` we can
1. Predefine Θ by discretizing the hyper-parameter space;
2. Evaluate each θ ∈ Θ using the objective with learned w’s;
3. Choose the hyper-parameters with the minimum objective.
This methodology simplifies the hyper-parameter learning
problem in Eq. 6 to a tuning problem. For instance, empiri-
cally, we tune the number of iterations as our stop criterion.
Later on, we will discuss how to use self-supervision to de-
sign the lower-level objective L in Eq. 6.
Self-Supervised Data Estimation
Denosing Autoencoder for Robustness. In contrast to DIP
that takes a fixed random noise image as input and the ad-
versarial image as the target, we also propose employing the
denoising autoencoder (DAE) [Vincent et al., 2008] to im-
prove the stability in data recovery using DIP. Different from
the original goal of DAE which is to learn a low-dimensional
encoding of the statistics of a dataset, here we apply DAE on
Algorithm 1 Denosing Autoencoder (DAE)
Input :adversarial sample x˜, initial weights w, network h, loss
`h, Gaussian std σ, number of iterations K, mini-batch
size n, learning rate η
Output :estimated true data xest
for k = 1, 2, · · · ,K do
Randomly draw n samples (s, z) ∼ N (x˜,σ)×N (x˜,σ);
w← w − η · ∂LDAE
∂w
; // Eq. 7
end
xest = Ez∼N (x˜,σ) [h(z;w, θ)] ; // mini-batch
return xest;
Algorithm 2 Robust Iterative Data Estimation (RIDE)
Input : adversarial sample x˜, network h, least-square loss `h,
Gaussian std σ = 0.5, numbers of iterations and check-
pointsK = 2000, T = 5, mini-batch size n = 1, learning
rate η = 10−4, interpolation parameter α = 0.9
Output :estimated true data xest
Initialize the network weights w(0), and x(0) ← x˜;
for t = 1, 2, · · · , T do
x
(t)
est ←DAE
(
x(t−1),w(t−1), h, `h,σ,K, n, η
)
;
x(t) ← αx(t−1) + (1− α)x(t)est;
end
return x(T )est ;
every single input to model its internal statistics similar to
DIL [Shocher, Cohen, and Irani, 2018]. Considering further
improvement on robustness over conventional DAE (see sup-
plementary material for comparison), in our implementation
we also add random Gaussian noise to the target, leading to
the following lower-level objective:
LDAE (x˜, ∅,w, θ)
= E(s,z)∼N (x˜,σ)×N (x˜,σ)
[
`h (s, h(z;w, θ))
]
, (7)
where s and z denote the reconstruction target and the net-
work input, respectively, and each N denotes a Gaussian
distribution with mean x˜ and std σ. To solve Eq. 7, we use
mini-batch stochastic gradient descent (SGD) by randomly
sampling the input-output pairs. We list our single-input DAE
algorithm in Alg. 1 for reference.
Robust Iterative Data Estimation (RIDE). DAE manages
to improve the robustness in data estimation, but it converges
slowly, as illustrated in Fig. 4(b), which may have a negative
impact on the defense within a limited number of iterations.
To remedy this, we propose RIDE, a novel integration of DAE
with iterative optimization that gradually estimates the true
data (the auxiliary variable u = x in Eq. 6) as the target for
fitting the network. As illustrated in Fig. 3(b), the lower-level
objective, LRIDE , can be formulated as follows:
LRIDE
(
x(t−1),x(t),w(t), θ
)
= LDAE
(
x(t), ∅,w(t), θ
)
+ λd
(
x(t),x(t−1)
)
,∀t, (8)
where {x(t)} denotes a sequence of the true data estimations
with x(0) = x˜, d denotes a distance measure as our regular-
izer, and λ ≥ 0 is a predefined constant. Comparing to Eq. 7,
Figure 4: Illustration of convergence improvement of the proposed
iterative optimization mechanism on (left) DIP and (right) DAE.
DAE is a special case of RIDE with x(t) = x˜,∀t. In particu-
lar, if both `h and d in Eq. 8 are mean squared error, we then
have a close-form solution for updating x(t) as follows:
x(t) = αx(t−1) + (1− α)x(t)est,∀t, (9)
where α = λ1+λ and x
(t)
est = Ez∼N (x(t−1),σ)[h(z;w(t), θ)].
Such update rule appears to be widely used in deep learn-
ing optimizers as momentum (e.g. , Adam [Kingma and Ba,
2014]) that helps accelerate gradients vectors in the right di-
rections, thus leading to faster converging. Along with DAE,
we list our RIDE algorithm in Alg.2, where all the numbers
denote the default hyper-parameter values in the defender1.
Note that such an iterative mechanism can also be inte-
grated into DIP, leading to the Iterative DIP (I-DIP) algo-
rithm. We illustrate the effects of our iterative mechanism
in Fig. 4 that clearly shows the convergence acceleration for
both DIP and DAE in reconstruction.
Theorem 1 (Convergence of RIDE). Suppose that ∀t,
LDAE
(
x(t−1), ∅,w(t), θ
)
≤ LDAE
(
x(t−1), ∅,w(t−1), θ
)
holds with sufficiently large number of iterations. Then RIDE
in Alg. 2 is guaranteed to converge locally with t→∞.
Please refer to the supplementary material for the proof.
Ablation Study on RIDE
Implementation of RIDE. By default we use an 8-layer fully
convolutional network (FCN) similar to the one used in DIL
[Shocher, Cohen, and Irani, 2018]. Except for the input and
output layers, all the other layers use 32 filters with size
3× 3. If using dropout, dropout layers with a ratio of 0.5 are
added at the 4, 5 and 6-th conv layers (check details in the
supplementary material). No batch normalization layers are
used. We initialize the model weights with random uniform
distribution. The loss function is the mean squared error
for DIP, DAE and RIDE. The model is optimized by the
Adam optimizer [Kingma and Ba, 2014] with a learning
rate 10−4 and weight decay 10−4. We fix the number of
iterations K = 2, 000 and check-points T = 5 for RIDE.
These parameters are fixed for all the following experiments
in this paper without further fine-tuning.
Dataset. We conduct experiments on the ImageNet [Deng
et al., 2009] classification dataset. The dataset comprises
1Theoretically x(T ) and x(T )est should merge when T →∞. Our
empirical studies on ImageNet show that x(T ) is closer to x˜ and
performs worse than x(T )est by ∼ 15% in terms of test accuracy.
1.2 million training and 50,000 validation images, where
each image has a label corresponding to one of the 1,000
classes. Following the setting of Prakash et al. [2018], we
utilize a subset of the validation data by randomly sampling
two images from each class, which consists of totally 2,000
images. Before being fed into the classifier and defenders,
the images are center-cropped into 224× 224 pixels.
Classifier. By default, we use the pretrained ResNet50 model
provided by PyTorch [Paszke et al., 2017] to evaluate our de-
fender2. The pretrained model achieves a top-1 classification
accuracy of 76.15% and 77.5% on the validation set and our
subset, respectively. For all the following experiments, the
classifier stays in evaluation mode, and no gradient informa-
tion is needed by our defenders.
Attacker. We employ the one-step FGSM attacker [Goodfel-
low, Shlens, and Szegedy, 2014] with step size 0.015.
Results
Dropout vs. DAE vs. Iterative Optimization. We compare
the accuracy of the proposed defenders (DIP, I-DIP, DAE
and RIDE) against the number of iterations using the default
hyper-parameters. As shown in Fig. 5(a), we observe that:
• Either dropout, or DAE, or iterative optimization can sig-
nificantly help alleviate the overfitting in DIP, leading to
better robustness in defense and better prediction recovery.
• Among the three, DAE seems to be the most important for
defense, and iterative optimization is the second.
• Our RIDE algorithm, which involves all the three tech-
niques, achieves the highest prediction accuracy.
We also show qualitative results in Fig. 6 to illustrate the
reconstruction process of a single image using our proposed
method. Note that the probability, p, of the ground-truth class
increases with the increase of the number of iterations during
the learning. Besides, the distance between the reconstructed
image and the clean image (dist2gt) is consistently smaller
than that between the reconstruction and the adversarial im-
age (dist2adv), which further supports the motivation of the
proposed algorithm as shown in Fig. 2(e).
Reconstruction Model h. We compare our FCN model with
U-Net [Ronneberger, Fischer, and Brox, 2015], which fea-
tures a symmetric encoder-decoder architecture with skip
connections, by conducting the same experiments in Fig. 5(a).
We observed a similar tendency of the curves, but the perfor-
mance is ∼ 8% lower for the U-Net model. Note that finding
the optimal network architecture for reconstruction is out of
the scope of this paper, and we will consider it in future work.
Mini-Batch Size n. We verify the performance of n =
{1, 2, 4, 8} due to the limit of the GPU memory. Note that
we still take a single image as input, while augmenting the
input and target images by adding different Gaussian noise.
As illustrated in Fig. 5(b), the performance using n = 1 is
2We also tested RIDE on VGG19 [Simonyan and Zisserman,
2015] and Inception V3 [Szegedy et al., 2016] using the default
hyper-parameter setting for ResNet50, which show 4.3% and 8.2%
performance drop compared to the defense result of ResNet50.
Please refer to the supplementary material for more details.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 5: Ablation study on RIDE in Alg. 2 by comparing the effects of: (a) dropout, DAE, and iterative optimization; (b) batch size n; (c)
interpolation parameter α; and (d) Gaussian std σ of DAE.
Figure 6: Visualization of the reconstruction process. From left to right: clean image, adversarial image, and reconstructed images via
self-supervision at different iterations. The class probability of the correct class (624 library) are shown under each image, as well as the
averaged Manhattan distances of the reconstructed image to the clean and adversarial images (dist2gt and dist2adv in [0, 255] space).
comparable with the others. Considering that both time and
memory consumption increase linearly with batch size, we
fix the mini-batch size as 1 for all the following experiments.
Interpolation Parameter α. As illustrated in Fig. 5(c) we
verify the performance of α = {0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.95, 1}. Note
that when α = 1, RIDE becomes the DAE defender. As we
see in Fig. 5(c), α = 0.9 achieves the highest accuracy, while
α = 0.95 performs marginally worse. α = 0.8 and 0.7 reach
peak performance at earlier stages, and we hypothesize that
the estimator x(t) becomes too far away from the unobserved
sample, which may be regarded as an underfit problem.
Gaussian Standard Deviation σ = σ × I, σ ≥ 0. For sim-
plicity, we represent σ as a scalar times an identity matrix.
Fig. 5(d) shows the influence of standard deviation in RIDE.
Recall that we add random Gaussian noise to both input and
target images to further improve the robustness. When σ = 0,
our model becomes a vanilla autoencoder-decoder. When σ
is too small, the model tends to learn an identity mapping,
while when σ is too large (e.g. , 2), the model is hard to
converge. By default, we set σ = 0.5 as this setting achieves
the best performance among what we tested.
Running Time and Memory Footprint. For each image in
the ImageNet dataset with size of 224×244 pixels, our RIDE
takes ∼ 140s to finish the optimization on an NVIDIA Titan
X GPU with a memory footprint of ∼ 1 gigabyte.
State-of-the-art Performance Comparison
Defense Against Gray-Box Attack
Following the experimental setup in the ablation study, we
first compare the defensive performance on ImageNet against
gray-box attacks as listed in Table 1, where the attack has
full access to the classifier, but not the defender. We use
the default parameters in RIDE, and the default classifier
ResNet50 with 77.5% top-1 accuracy using clean images.
Table 1: Performance comparison of different defenders on Im-
ageNet against gray-box attacks. We show the top-1 accuracy of
median filtering [Guo et al., 2018], total variance minimization
(TVM) [Guo et al., 2018], and our RIDE against both single-step
FGSM [Szegedy et al., 2013] and iterative PGD [Madry et al., 2017].
No Attack No Defender Median TVM RIDE (Ours)
FGSM 0.775 0.075 0.306 0.359 0.517PGD 0.000 0.251 0.301 0.476
For the attacks, we use the public code released by Guo et al.
[2018], and for TVM defense, we use the Python scikit-image
package [van der Walt et al., 2014].
Median Filtering. We test different kernel sizes for the me-
dian filter, i.e. k ∈ {3, 5, 7, 9, 11}. For a given kernel size k,
the input image is zero-padded by
⌊
k
2
⌋
along the boundaries
to keep the input size unchanged (i.e. , 224× 224). We report
the best result under each attacker in Table 1. Please refer to
our supplementary material for more results.
TV Minimization. Total variance minimization (TVM) tries
to find an image similar to the input image but with less to-
tal variance. The trade-off is controlled by the weight factor
where a larger one results in an image with less total vari-
ance at the cost of less similarity. The application of TVM
on adversarial defense was recently introduced by Guo et al.
[2018] and tested on ImageNet. There are two commonly
used TVM algorithms called the split-Bregman and Cham-
bolle. In Table 1 we show the best results among the two.
Please refer to our supplementary material for more results.
Results & Discussion. As we see in Table 1, our RIDE de-
fender significantly outperforms the rest by at least 15.8%
and 17.5% under the attack of FGSM and PGD, respectively.
Recall that our RIDE is developed for the stronger white-
box attack, it should also work for the gay-box attacks. As a
demonstration, we compare with median filtering and TVM,
which have achieved (near) state-of-the-art performance on
Table 2: Performance comparison with the state-of-the-art defend-
ers against the BPDA attacker. Our RIDE defender achieves the best
performance on all the three datasets under stronger attacks (i.e. ,
larger maximum distances). Except RIDE, all the other numbers
are cited from the results reported by Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner
[2018] under similar experimental settings.
Defense Dataset Distance Accuracy
Samangouei et al. (2018) MNIST 0.005 (`2) 55%
RIDE (Ours) MNIST 0.1 (`∞) 98%
Buckman et al. (2018) CIFAR 0.031 (`∞) 0%
Dhillon et al. (2018) CIFAR 0.031 (`∞) 0%
Ma et al. (2018) CIFAR 0.031 (`∞) 5%
Song et al. (2018) CIFAR 0.031 (`∞) 9%
Na et al. (2018) CIFAR 0.015 (`∞) 15%
Madry et al. (2018) CIFAR 0.031 (`∞) 47%
RIDE (Ours) CIFAR 0.050 (`∞) 76%
Xie et al. (2018) ImageNet 0.031 (`∞) 0%
Guo et al. (2018) ImageNet 0.005 (`2) 0%
RIDE (Ours) ImageNet 0.050 (`∞) 43%
several benchmark datasets without classifier re-training or
external data for defense. Those methods share the same
setting as RIDE. We are aware that there exist some other
methods that may perform better. For instance, the image
quilting defense also proposed by Guo et al. [2018]. However,
it requires a collection of one million clean images as an
“image bank”, whose patches are used to replace the regions
in the adversarial images at inference time. Since it does
not follow the setting that no external data should be used,
for a fair comparison, we do not directly compare with such
defenders. However, the performance of RIDE is still highly
comparable to the accuracy reported by Guo et al. [2018].
Defense Against White-Box Attack
Datasets. Besides our randomly selected dataset from Ima-
geNet, here we also test our RIDE on MNIST and CIFAR-10
to demonstrate the broad applicability of our algorithm. Both
datasets contain 50k training and 10k test images, divided into
10 classes. Images in MNIST are grayscale of size 28× 28,
while CIFAR contains color images of size 32× 32.
Classifiers. For ImageNet, we continue to use ResNet50 as
before. For MNIST, we train a simple CNN model with two
convolutional and two fully connected layers, which reports a
test accuracy of 98.98%. For CIFAR-10, we train a ResNet18
model with a test accuracy of 94.78%.
Attackers. We employ the BPDA attacker [Athalye, Carlini,
and Wagner, 2018] to verify our white-box defense perfor-
mance because as far as we know, BPDA is currently the only
attacker that can utilize the information (i.e. , the outputs)
of the defenders to attack the input images iteratively as a
wrapper where in the inner loop another attacker is utilized.
Specifically, for the inner loop, we apply the iterative `∞
PGD attack [Madry et al., 2017] for 10 iterations. For Ima-
geNet and CIFAR-10, we perform the iterative attack with a
step size of 0.01 and maximum perturbation of 0.05 on im-
ages normalized to (0, 1). For MNIST, we perform a stronger
attack with maximum `∞ of 0.1 and step size of 0.02.
Networks for RIDE. For ImageNet, we use the same network
as the one in the ablation study. Since the images in both
(a) (b)
Figure 7: Analysis of defense against BPDA on MNIST: (a) Dis-
tances among adversarial, defended, and ground-truth images; (b)
Top-1 test accuracy of both the defended and adversarial images.
MNIST and CIFAR-10 are much smaller, here we propose
another two 4-layer (i.e. , 1 → 16 → 16 → 16 → 1 with
ReLU activations) and 5-layer (i.e. , 3→ 32→ 32→ 32→
32→ 3 with ReLU activations) FCNs for them, respectively.
Results & Discussion. We list all the comparison results
in Table 2. The accuracy indicates that even under stronger
attacks, our RIDE still can significantly outperform the state-
of-the-art defenders by large margins on all three datasets.
Recall that the BPDA attacker assumes that g(x) ≈ x
holds for a defender g and estimate the gradient through
∇xf(g(x))|x=x˜ ≈ ∇f(x)|x=g(x˜). To analyze why RIDE
can survive the attack, we compute the image distances on
MNIST (Fig. 7(a)). After 10-iteration attacks, the distances of
the defended images to the adversarial images (defend2adv)
for RIDE have a similar distribution as median filtering, both
of which are much lower than TVM. This indicates that the
assumption of g(x) ≈ x in BPDA is very likely to hold
for RIDE. However, the distances of the clean images to the
adversarial (adv2gt) and defended images (defense2gt) using
RIDE are significantly lower than the other methods. This
indicates that the gradients w.r.t. the input are hindered by
RIDE, making the adversarial images much “cleaner”.
Besides, we feed both the adversarial and defended images
after the attacks into the classifier. Fig. 7(b) indicates that for
both kinds of images RIDE achieves ∼ 98% accuracy while
the other two perform much worse. Refer to Eq. 3, we have:
∇xf(g(x;ω(x))) = ∂g
∂x
· ∇f(g(x;ω(x)))
= [I,∇ω(x)]∇g(x;ω(x))∇f(g(x;ω(x))). (10)
With full access to both defender and classifier, the attacker
can still compute ∇f(g(x;ω(x))),∇g(x;ω(x)). However,
calculating ∇ω(x) can be extremely difficult because ω dif-
fers for each individual sample. So the explicit form of ω can
not be estimated without knowing the prior distribution of the
inputs. Such an input-dependent function breaks the assump-
tion ∇xf(g(x))|x=x˜ ≈ ∇f(x)|x=g(x˜) in BPDA, which is
fundamental for the success of a functional defender.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel functional-based adversarial
defender, RIDE, against white-box adversarial attacks without
any modification of well-trained classifiers. Our defender
utilizes an iterative self-supervised optimization algorithm to
estimate the clean data for each individual adversarial input.
For future work, we will focus on improving the optimizing
efficiency of RIDE and target for real-time applications.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. To prove this theorem, we consider the first three ar-
guments in LRIDE in Eq. 8 as variables, and try to minimize
the loss by optimizing these variables one-by-one. To do so,
based on the assumption in the theorem, Eq. 8 and Alg. 2, we
have that ∀t,
LRIDE
(
x(t−1),x(t−1),w(t), θ
)
≥ LRIDE
(
x(t−1),x(t),w(t), θ
)
⇐= Eq.9 (11)
≥ LRIDE
(
x(t),x(t),w(t), θ
)
⇐= d(x(t),x(t−1)) = 0
(12)
≥ LRIDE
(
x(t),x(t),w(t+1), θ
)
.⇐= Eq.7, 8, assmp.
(13)
Eq. 11 optimizes the second variable based on Eq. 9 while
fixing the rest variables. Eq. 12 optimizes the first variable
by making the distance term equal to 0 while fixing the
rest. Eq. 13 optimizes the third variable by training the net-
work while fixing the rest. Moreover, since LRIDE is lower-
bounded by 0, we then can complete our proof.
Implementation Details
Non-Maximum Suppression. To further prevent the recon-
struction model from overfitting, we apply the non-maximum
suppression at the convex combination step. That is, for
current reconstructed and target images x(t)est and x
(t) ∈
R3×H×W , we calculate the pixel-wise `1 norm of the dif-
ference and get a set of distances at time step t.
S
(t)
d = {di|di = ‖xi − x′i‖1, xi ∈ x(t), x′i ∈ x(t)est} (14)
where i is the index of the corresponding pixel. Because the
optimization goal is to recover the image without overfitting
to the adversarial target, the non-maximum suppression oper-
ation here is that for a given threshold τ , the pixel pairs with
di < τ are excluded in the convex combination steps and the
pixels in the target image x(t) are directly substituted by the
corresponding pixels in the reconstructed image x(t)est. The
reason is that when the distance between the reconstructed im-
age and target image are already close enough, substitute pix-
els in the adversarial image with pixels in the reconstructed
image can decrease the tendency of overfitting but cause lit-
tle influence on the learning of image content and texture.
For all the experiments with iterative updating described in
this paper, we just set the threshold τ = median{Sd}, which
is calculated adaptively on each individual image without
substantial parameter searching.
Random Loss Masking. Another technique we apply to the
self-supervised image reconstruction process is to randomly
mask out part of the pixels in the loss calculation. Because the
reconstruction network works on a single image, therefore no
matter what are the noise patterns in the adversarial image,
the model can easily overfit to it. Therefore we can randomly
exclude p portion of the pixels in loss calculation at each
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Figure 8: Comparison of different proposed defenders on classi-
fication performance (left) without, or (right) with dropout layers
in the reconstruction model. This figure just separates the curves in
Fig. 5(a) to clearly indicate the incremental performance improve-
ment of different proposed techniques.
iteration. Although after updating the model for thousands
of iterations by expectation every pixel in the target image
should be directly supervised for several times, the random
loss masking can still alleviate the risk of overfitting because
every iteration the pixel value for some pixels are learned not
based on its noisy version but the context in the corresponding
field of view. We show experiments on RIDE with fixed
convex combination factor α = 0.9 using different random
masking ratio p in Fig. 9. Accordingly, for all the experiments
in the paper, we fix the random masking ratio of p = 0.9.
Model Architecture. Here we show the architectures of the
reconstruction models used in our experiments (Table 3). The
random dropout ratio for Dropout layers is 0.5.
Image Normalization. Pre-trained PyTorch classifiers (e.g.
, ResNet50, VGG19, and InceptionV3) suppose that an
input image is normalized to have zero mean. Specifi-
cally, for our ablation study and gray-box defense experi-
ments on ImageNet dataset, the adversarial images are pre-
computed, and before feeding the images into the RIDE de-
fender, the pixel values of the images are normalized by
means µ = (0.485, 0.456, 0.406) and standard deviation
σ = (0.229, 0.224, 0.225). Therefore there is no sigmoid
activation for the reconstruction model in RIDE for ablation
study and gray-box defense experiments. However, for the
white-box setting (i.e., BPDA) the perturbations need to be
calculated on-the-fly, therefore we add a sigmoid activation
to the reconstruction model to make the values of the out-
put images restricted to (0, 1), and make the normalization a
differentiable layer at the beginning of the classifier.
We apply the same operation for CIFAR-10 and MNIST
under the white-box defense setting. The mean and standard
deviation for CIFAR-10 are the same as those used for Ima-
geNet. For MNIST, which consists of gray-scale images, the
mean is 0.1307 while the standard deviation is 0.3081.
Additional Results
Other Classifier & Clean Images. To show the transferabil-
ity of the proposed defense algorithm, we also tested the
RIDE defender on VGG19 [Simonyan and Zisserman, 2015]
and Inception V3 [Szegedy et al., 2016] models. Using the
optimal hyper-parameter settings for ResNet50, the RIDE
defender show only 4.3% and 8.2% performance drop on
VGG19 and Inception V3 models compared to the FGSM de-
Table 3: Architecture of reconstruction models. All layers except
the output layer (convn) are followed by a ReLU activation. There
is a sigmoid activation following the output layer if the image range
is (0, 1), and no activation for image normalized with mean = 0.
Dataset Layer Name Input Planes Output Planes Dropout
ImageNet
conv1 3 32
conv2 32 32
conv3 32 32
conv4 32 32 3
conv5 32 32 3
conv6 32 32 3
conv7 32 32
convn 32 3
MNIST
conv1 1 16
conv2 16 16 3
conv3 16 16 3
convn 16 1
CIFAR-10
conv1 3 32
conv2 32 32 3
conv3 32 32 3
conv4 32 32
convn 32 3
Table 4: Performance of median filtering against gray-box attacks.
We show the top-1 accuracy of different kernel_size on ImageNet
validation set. The highest value is reported in Table 1.
Attack 3 5 7 9 11
FGSM 0.180 0.281 0.306 0.277 0.241
PGD 0.005 0.128 0.238 0.251 0.228
Table 5: Performance of total-variation denoising using split-
Bregman optimization against gray-box attacks. We show the top-1
accuracy of different denoising_weight on ImageNet validation
set. The highest value is reported in Table 1.
Attack 0.075 0.125 0.25 0.5 0.75
FGSM 0.312 0.339 0.359 0.326 0.288
PGD 0.281 0.301 0.289 0.218 0.149
Table 6: Performance of Chambolle total-variation denoising
against gray-box attacks. We show the top-1 accuracy of differ-
ent denoising_weight on ImageNet validation set. The highest
values under two attacks are lower than the Bregman method.
Attack 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 1.25 1.5 1.75
FGSM 0.174 0.277 0.321 0.341 0.332 0.323 0.315
PGD 0.017 0.138 0.234 0.267 0.279 0.283 0.285
fense result reported on ResNet50 (i.e., 51.7%). Not that the
adversarial samples are calculated using the target classifiers
instead of using the ones generated for ResNet50. Besides,
when taking the clean images as inputs, the test accuracy is
61.75% using the ResNet50 model.
Median Filtering. We show the results of using median fil-
tering as defenders under gray-box setting on the ImageNet
validation dataset in Table 4. For a given kernel size k (an
odd number), the input image is zero-padded by
⌊
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Figure 9: Comparison of the proposed RIDE algorithm using fixed
target image (blue curves) or target image with random Gaussian
noise (red curves). We show the comparison with random loss
masking ratio of p = 0.9 and p = 0.8.
the boundaries to keep the input size unchanged (224× 224).
TV Minimization. Total variance minimization (TVM) tries
to find an image similar to the input image but with less total
variance. The trade-off is controlled by the weight factor w
where a larger w results in an image with less total variance
at the expense of less similarity. The application of TVM
on adversarial defense was recently introduced by Guo et al.
[2018] and are tested on the ImageNet dataset. There are two
commonly used TVM algorithms called the split-Bregman
and Chambolle. Here we show the defense performance of
the two algorithms in Table 5 and 6. The highest scores are
reported in Table 1.
Qualitative Results
We show the qualitative comparisons on MNIST, CIFAR, and
ImageNet datasets in the following figures.
(a)	Median	Filtering (b)	TV	Minimization (c)	RIDE	(Ours)
Figure 10: Qualitative results of defense against 10-iteration PGD attack (with BPDA) on MNIST dataset using median filtering (a),
total-variance minimization (b) and the proposed RIDE algorithm (c). The predicted label of each image is shown on top of it.
(a)	Median	Filtering (b)	TV	Minimization (c)	RIDE	(Ours)
Figure 11: Qualitative results of defense against 10-iteration PGD attack (with BPDA) on CIFAR-10 dataset using median filtering (a),
total-variance minimization (b) and the proposed RIDE algorithm (c). The predicted label of each image is shown on top of it. The last row of
RIDE denote a failure case.
(a) cliff dwelling (500) (b) Saluki, gazelle hound (176) (c) potpie (964)
Figure 12: Qualitative results of defense against 10-iteration PGD attack (with BPDA) on ImageNet dataset, using the proposed RIDE defender.
Every two-column shows both the adversarial and defended images after 1,4 and 10 iterations of attack. The predicted label of each image is
shown on top of it, where (c) denotes a failure case.
